







A boom in scientific and humanities-based research into 
the arts (amply evident in the pages of this journal) leaves 
scholars across the academy grappling with the challenge of 
how best to combine their efforts. Since correctly sizing up 
a challenge is crucial to surmounting it, I first posit that a 
powerful yet mistaken meme governs interactions between 
scientists and humanists. According to the meme, the sci-
ences and the humanities are “two cultures” that must be 
“bridged.” To take two recent examples, the neuroscientist 
Eric Kandel gives his book Reductionism in Art and Brain 
Science the subtitle Bridging the Two Cultures, while the film 
scholar Murray Smith gives his defense of a naturalized ap-
proach to film the title Film, Art, and the Third Culture [1,2]. 
Inasmuch as the two-cultures meme tends to secure the very 
silos that scholars endeavor to escape, the remedy is to re-
place it with a more nuanced model that situates research on 
the arts within a space that is layered and bounded. Such a 
space can integrate research in the sciences with research in 
such fields as art history, ethnomusicology and literary stud-
ies. (“Arts research,” in which artists do research through art, 
is a separate matter, for another occasion.)
NomoTheTiC ANd ideogRAphiC
To illustrate how the two-cultures meme shapes thinking 
about research into the arts, consider the reaction to Semir 
Zeki’s Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain [3]. 
Zeki takes credit for coining the word neuroaesthetics, his 
book made a splash, and the controversy around its recep-
tion is revealing.
Vision comprises a suite of systems that extract the stable 
features of scenes and objects from light energies, and Zeki 
argues that works of visual art exploit this functional spe-
cialization of vision. Cézanne’s paintings appeal because they 
isolate the system for processing three-dimensional shape 
information. Calder’s mobiles appeal because they isolate the 
workings of regions of the visual cortex that are responsible 
for seeing motion. Each succeeds because his work plays off 
the architecture of vision, and Zeki defends the hypothesis 
that the “general function of art” is the same as that of the 
brain, namely to represent “essential, non-changing aspects 
of the visual world” [4].
Much reaction to Zeki takes issue less with the details of 
his argument and more with his ambition to understand 
visual art as a strictly neurobiological phenomenon [5–7]. 
Zeki clearly loves Cézanne and Calder, and he strives to share 
what he sees in them. He embodies Blake Gopnik’s portrait 
of the scientist who “wants to practice a kind of art criticism 
and interpretation, helping all of us to be better art lovers by 
getting us to understand what’s most basic to appreciating 
art” [8]. For Zeki’s critics, however, science is just not up 
to the task. Gabrielle Starr, a literary scholar sympathetic to 
scientific research into the arts, wonders “for how much of 
the complexity of (reading) Tolstoy can [the neurosciences] 
account, and how might they differentiate (reading) Tolstoy 
from Dickens or Keats? How many factors would a rich ex-
planatory model that could do this require? Ten thousand? 
A whole genome?” [9].
Some old-fashioned terminology articulates the clash of 
two cultures underlying the reaction to Zeki. On the one 
hand, science is “nomothetic,” concerned with generalized 
regularities. On the other hand, the humanities are ideo-
graphic, concerned with what is specific to individual art-
works. As long as science is nomothetic and the humanities 
are ideographic, no hypothesis about the “general function 
of art” can yield a richly specific interpretation of a painting 
by Cézanne or a Calder mobile.
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A Layered, Bounded, integrated Approach 
to Research on the Arts across disciplines
d o m i N i C  m C i v e R  L o p e S
Cooperation among arts scholars is thought to be hampered by the 
division of research on the arts into two cultures, one scientific, one 
humanistic. This article proposes an alternative model for arts research, 
wherein multiple levels of explanation focused on well-bounded 
phenomena integrate research across academic disciplines. Two  
case studies of research that fit the model are presented.
©2020 ISAST  https://doi.org/10.1162/leon_a_01743 LEONARDO, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 537–541, 2020 537
538 Lopes, A Layered, Bounded, Integrated Approach to Research on the Arts across Disciplines
ACCommodATioN ANd SpeCiALizATioN
Familiar strategies for bridging the two cultures go along 
with the picture of science as nomothetic and the humani-
ties as ideographic.
One bridging strategy is mutual accommodation: Sci-
ence and the humanities round out and complement each 
other, each contributing a distinct perspective to a total 
understanding of the arts. Smith, speaking for the humani-
ties, characterizes the humanities as engaged in criticism, “a 
kind of thick discourse, blending descriptive, explanatory, 
and evaluative claims,” and science offers to “explain why the 
techniques of practitioners work as they do” [10]. The same 
accommodation strategy is recommended by Steven Pinker, 
a scientist: “The promise of science is to enrich and diversify 
the intellectual tools of humanistic scholarship, not to oblit-
erate them . . . there can be no replacement for the varieties 
of close reading, thick description, and deep immersion that 
erudite scholars apply to individual works” [11].
Another bridging strategy proposes a division of labor. 
Since humanists have deep and intimate knowledge of in-
dividual cultural objects, they set the agenda for scientific 
research. Thus Smith writes that humanists “identify the 
problems that need addressing, pose the questions to be ex-
plored, and clarify the concepts through which the questions 
are articulated and on the basis of which empirical inves-
tigation should proceed” [12]. The psychologist Rolf Reber 
seconds the proposal: Philosophers and humanities scholars 
“define the criterion of what the experience is expected to 
be; scientists . . . provide a test of whether this criterion is 
fulfilled” [13].
The lesson is not that accommodation and division of 
labor are bad strategies. On the contrary, they have much 
to commend them. Yet neither strategy challenges the two-
cultures meme. Perhaps new strategies will emerge if we chal-
lenge the meme?
WheRe The meme goeS WRoNg
If the above two sections are on track, the two-cultures meme 
views science as nomothetic and the humanities as ideo-
graphic, and familiar strategies for bridging the two cultures 
follow this way of distinguishing them. So far, so good, unless 
the distinction misrepresents science or the humanities. In 
fact, it misrepresents both.
Obviously, some research is nomothetic—concerned with 
generalized phenomena—and some is ideographic—con-
cerned with individual specificity. However, the nomothetic-
ideographic distinction does not line up with the distinction 
between the sciences and the humanities. Some science is 
ideographic (e.g. natural history). More crucially, a great 
deal of humanities research is nomothetic, seeking to ex-
plain patterns across data. For example, postcolonial literary 
studies explain the incidence of certain themes, metaphors, 
personal stereotypes and genres as products of colonial social 
 formations.
If humanities scholars are interested in the arts as his-
torical and social phenomena, then their hypotheses are 
hypotheses of history, sociology, anthropology or econom-
ics. Nomothetic research in the humanities overlaps with, or 
belongs to, the social sciences.
What we need is a distinction between nomothetic re-
search into the arts, which is at home in the sciences and 
the humanities alike, and the ideographic approach repre-
sented by art criticism. When we think about how to make 
this distinction, two questions arise: How are nomothetic 
generalizations relevant to art criticism, and how is art criti-
cism relevant to nomothetic research? These are thorny ques-
tions as much for humanists as for scientists. Posing these 
questions exposes no gap between the sciences and the hu-
manities; it exposes a gap between criticism and nomothetic 
inquiry. If we set criticism aside, there is but one culture of 
nomothetic research on the arts. No two cultures need bridg-
ing or the company of a third culture.
LAyeRed, BouNded, iNTegRATed
The meme of two cultures paints a picture of what obstructs 
cooperation between scholars from different disciplines do-
ing research on the arts, and it sets us up to seek coopera-
tion via accommodation and division of labor. What does 
cooperation look like in an alternative, one-culture model?
Taken together, the sciences represent reality as layered. 
For example, a pattern of behavior explained in the vocabu-
lary of psychology will be realized by some neurobiological 
mechanisms, which will be realized by some biochemical 
mechanisms, which are ultimately realized by some physical 
mechanisms. According to the standard model in philosophy 
of science, causal explanations that refer to phenomena at 
a relatively macro level are realized by causal patterns that 
refer to phenomena at a more micro level [14–16]. Figure 1 
diagrams a toy example in which a biological explanation of 
a gene coding for a trait is realized at the biochemical level 
by an acid causing protein synthesis. Philosophers disagree 
about the details of the standard model, but they agree with 
scientists on the general picture that the sciences yield expla-
nations, at different levels, of a layered world.
The standard model of layered levels of explanation sug-
gests a new diagnosis of where Zeki overreaches. In attempt-
ing to understand visual art as a strictly neurobiological 
phenomenon, he leaves no room for historical and social 
explanations of artistic phenomena. He excludes a social level 
of explanation [17].
Fig. 1. Example of relationship between biological and biochemical levels 
of explanation. Arrows indicate causation; dotted lines indicate microlevel 
realization of macrolevel phenomena. (© Dominic McIver Lopes)
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Zeki’s overreaching in this way interacts with a second 
overreach, as he seeks grand explanation of all visual art as 
serving one “general function.” The fact that there are many 
kinds of visual art, not just one, is easy to miss as long as one 
overlooks the social and historical factors behind specific 
artistic practices.
The lesson is that reality is not only layered but also 
bounded into discrete phenomena. As long as we think only 
in terms of acids and proteins, we will fail to see genes and 
the traits they encode. As long as we think only in terms 
of the neurobiology of perception, we will miss the social 
formations that make sense of different kinds of art—from 
impressionism to ukiyo-e to photography in the pictorialist 
tradition.
In Fig. 2, rows represent levels of explanation and columns 
represent kinds of art whose boundaries are drawn so as to 
foster integration. Integration occurs when researchers in 
different disciplines converge on a common conception of 
the phenomenon that they are trying to explain, even if they 
disagree about how to explain it [18]. Bounding and layering 
facilitate integration. Making space for all levels of explana-
tion, including social explanation, means converging on a 
more fine-grained conception of what is to be explained than 
some “general function of art.”
iNTegRATioN: CASeS
For two examples of research into the arts that nicely fit the 
proposed model, consider work by the art historian Michael 
Baxandall and the psychologist James Cutting. While each 
examines a different artistic phenomenon, both are sensitive 
to how an explanation of a well-bounded phenomenon at one 
level ties into explanations at other levels.
Baxandall’s topic is the “period eye,” which is a “confor-
mity between discriminations demanded by a painting and 
skills of discrimination possessed by the beholder” [19]. In 
different periods, spectators differ in their interpretation 
skills, category concepts and habits of making inferences 
and drawing analogies. Since variations in cognitive style 
impact attention, hence appreciative experiences, they bet-
ter equip some spectators to meet the demands of images in 
a period. Inasmuch as a painter can only ask spectators to 
use the skills they have, spectators’ visual capacities are the 
painter’s medium [20].
Most delightful is what Baxandall says about the capacity 
of members of the quattrocento merchant class for commer-
cial gauging. In a time before standardized measures, anyone 
involved in business learned geometrical methods for gaug-
ing quantities. Baxandall quotes a contemporary textbook:
There is a barrel, each of its ends being 2 bracci in diameter; 
the diameter at its bung is 2 1/4 bracci and halfway between 
bung and end it is 2 2/9 bracci. The barrel is 2 bracci long. 
What is its cubic measure?
This is like a pair of truncated cones. Square the diameter 
at the ends: 2 × 2 = 4. Then square the median diameter  
2 2/9 × 2 2/9 = 4 76/81. Add them together: 8 76/81. Multiply 
2 × 2 2/9 = 4 4/9. Add this to 8 76/81 = 13 31/81. Divide by 3 
= 4 112/243 . . . Now square 2 1/4 = 2 1/4 × 2 1/4 = 5 1/16. Add 
it to the square of the median diameter: 15 5/16 + 4 76/81 
= 10 1/129. Divide by 3: 5 1/3888. Add it to the first result:  
4 112/243 + 5 1/3888 = 9 1792/3888. Multiply this by 11 and 
then divide by 14: the final result is 7 23600/54432.
He then dryly remarks, “It is a special intellectual world” 
[21]. What is special is the dizzying arithmetic, but also 
what precedes it, the automatic and comprehensive analysis 
of complex forms into combinations of regular geometrical 
solids. Quattrocento Italian merchants brought their geom-
eter’s skill to looking at pictures that were made to be looked 
at with the same trained eye.
Cutting’s topic is the formation of the impressionist canon 
[22]. Assuming that a canon comprises the most often repro-
duced works, Cutting identifies the impressionist canon by 
surveying books in the Cornell University library. He then 
measures preferences for impressionist paintings, which he 
finds not to be a function of whether the paintings are in-
cluded in the influential collection of Gustave Caillebotte, or 
whether they are displayed in the Musée d’Orsay, or whether 
they are prototypically impressionist, or based on the sub-
jects’ training in art history. Rather, his finding is that prefer-
ences are mostly a function of mere exposure, hence simple 
frequency of appearance in the environment. As Cutting 
explains, “We digest images voraciously, even without no-
ticing. A very small proportion of these images are from the 
impressionist corpus and canon. Nonetheless, we respond to 
their occurrence in our future interactions with impression-
ism. We like the ones we have seen before” [23]. If Cutting 
is correct, mere exposure is an important mechanism for 
transmitting and entrenching artistic culture.
Both studies work within a layered and bounded research 
space. Working top down, Baxandall sees the aesthetics of 
a painting practice within a social group as realized by the 
learned perceptual expertise of members of the group, and he 
clearly regards perceptual expertise as a psychological com-
petence. Meanwhile, Cutting works bottom up, explicating 
the workings of a psychological mechanism, mere exposure, 
that realizes a social process, namely canon-formation. Cut-
ting offers humanistic art scholars a tool for understand-
ing cultural transmission; Baxandall invites scientists to 
study the mechanisms that underlie social transactions 
within some social practices. Layering and bounding foster 
integration.
Fig. 2. Example of a layered, bounded, integrated program of research on 
the arts. (© Dominic McIver Lopes)
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BouNdiNg The ARTS
Integration occurs when scholars in different disciplines 
attempt explanations, at multiple levels, of a well-bounded 
phenomenon. Disciplinary methods and training already 
ensure explanations given at multiple levels: Historians will 
do history, after all, and neuroscientists will do neurosci-
ence. The challenge remains to ensure that phenomena are 
well bounded. Phenomena are well bounded when they are 
categorized so as to invite research at every level. So we need 
a general framework that can be used to assemble a working 
conception of any kind of art and that makes an explicit call 
for research at all levels of explanation.
A recently proposed framework for generating concep-
tions of “art kinds” is fit for this purpose [24]. According to 
the framework, we should think of any art kind as a class of 
works that share a medium and belong to a social practice 
that is constituted by norms centered on the medium. This 
formula packs in some key ideas.
First, an art kind is a class of works bounded so as to cap-
ture its role in empirical hypotheses. Not all classes of works 
are art kinds in this sense. The class of artworks made on a 
Tuesday afternoon is not an art kind because there are no 
true empirical generalizations about works made on Tues-
day afternoons. Since there are true empirical generalizations 
about the class of works that are nineteenth-century novels in 
English, they form an art kind. Art kinds include art forms 
(music, dance, painting), genres (still life, horror), traditions 
(Hollywood and Bollywood) and styles (rococo, modernist).
Second, works in an art kind share a medium. Every art-
work is an artifact, made by someone who endows it with 
features to be apprehended by others. Obviously, the features 
endowed and manipulated vary systematically from one art 
kind to the next. A painter works with the visual configura-
tion of a surface, a horror writer works with an audience’s 
propensity to respond to certain characters and events with a 
mixture of disgust and fear, a Bollywood director works with 
the tropes of her tradition, and a modernist architect works 
with a restricted vocabulary of forms and materials. In the 
visual arts, “media” are materials, such as paint or clay. Speak-
ing more broadly, a medium is a combination of resources 
(e.g. paint, the diatonic scale, language, affective disposi-
tions) and techniques (using brushes, playing instruments, 
versifying, depicting monsters), where the techniques unlock 
what the resources afford [25]. As long as medium = resource 
+ technique, the horror writer’s medium is a tool of narration 
that is used to tell stories that afford horror responses.
Finally, a social practice consists in a pattern of behavior 
that is explained by agents complying with a norm, where 
a norm is a rule of action with which agents comply be-
cause they expect others to also comply [26,27]. Attending 
musical concerts is a social practice that consists in agents 
performing various actions, such as sitting quietly and lis-
tening, because they know that is what is expected of them 
by composers, performers, impresarios and other audience 
members. According to the proposed framework, an art kind 
involves norms concerning how the technical resources of a 
medium are to be used. In fifteenth-century Italian paint-
ing, artists are expected to mark surfaces and audiences are 
expected to perceive them in a manner that engages certain 
geometrical analysis skills.
How do the three elements of the framework invite inte-
grated research? First, an art kind is a class of items bounded 
to promote explanations at multiple levels. Second, the con-
cept of a medium conceives features of works as inputs to and 
outputs of cognitive processes. To explain the medium, we 
need psychology and the brain sciences. Finally, social prac-
tices point to culture—to interactions among agents, over 
time, governed by expectations. To explain the practice, we 
need the historical, anthropological, sociological and eco-
nomic hypotheses of scholars in the humanities.
The time has come to retire the meme of two cultures. 
Research into the arts should not be seen as divided into two 
cultures that need bridging; there is only culture made up of 
multiple, converging lines of inquiry, some in the sciences, 
some in the humanities.
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